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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

A

RICHARD SAWISLAK*

IN nearly every field of practice workmen's compensation

changes are affected by both statutory amendment and case decision. In the past year the legislature has amended the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act by raising the benefit rates and changing the employer's accident reporting requirements. The twenty percent increase in benefit rates was part of a major revision of the Act
which was first passed in June of 1971.' That bill was partially vetoed
by the governor pursuant to his new constitutional power2 and his
recommended bill was returned to the legislature, passed and finally
approved on October 28, 1971.8 Questions concerning the effective
date of that bill were raised after the supreme court ruled that
the parochaid bills,4 passed under similar circumstances and with
the same effective date, could not become effective until July 1,
1972. In any case, the legislature reenacted as Public Act 77-1871
the same rate increases. The amendments were approved and became effective June 26, 1972. It expressly repealed the previous
amendment to the Act, certified October 28, 1971, and provided
that the repeal shall not affect any rights, obligations or actions arising pursuant to the 1971 amendatory act."
There has been no expression from the court as to what rate
should apply between October 28, 1971 and June 26, 1972; and
except for the confusion brought on by this situation, the application
of the new rate schedule holds no mystery to the practitioner who
* MR. SAWISLAK received his L.L.B. Degree from the University of Illinois Law
School, is co-editor of the Illinois State Bar Workmen's Compensation Newsletter
and a member of the Chicago law firm of Sweeney and Riman.

1. H.B. 844, 77th 111. G.A. (1971).
2. Ill. Const. art. 4, § 9(e) (1970).
3. Pub. Act No. 77-1659 (1971).
4. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, Auditor of Public Accounts, 50 Il1. 2d
242, 278 N.E.2d 84 (1972).
5. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.5 et seq. (Supp. 1972).

122

1972]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

has computed employee benefits in the past. Arbitrators generally
are applying the new rates as of October 28, 1971.
Most practitioners are generally aware of the Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970.6 In part, that Act establishes
standards for occupational health and safety and procedures for enforcing them. The law also provides that states may preempt by
setting up their own requirements for reporting of accidents, inspections, enforcement, etc., as long as the local requirements are not inconsistent and are as strict as or stricter than those prescribed by the
federal act.
The Illinois Health and Safety Act,7 as amended and effective on
July 1, 1972, provides that the federal safety and health standards
promulgated in accordance with the Federal Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 are made rules of the Illinois Industrial
Commission. In order to bring the Illinois practice into compliance
with these standards, the legislature has amended, effective July 1,
1972, Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,8 relating to
the employer's requirements to maintain accurate records and make
necessary reports.
Until this section was amended the Workmen's Compensation
Act required the employer to sumbit a written report between the
15th and 25th of each month listing all injuries where compensation
had been paid and where the employee had lost more than one week
from work. A second report was required when it was determined
that permanent disability had or would result. No penal provisions
for failure to report were provided.
The Illinois employer is now required to maintain accurate records
of work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses, except those which only
require first aid and do not involve medical treatment, lost consciousness or restriction of work, motion or a transfer to another job. In
case of death, as a result of a work-related injury or illness, a report
must be filed with the Industrial Commission within two working
days of the death. Where the injury or illness results in the loss of
more than one scheduled working day or an inability to perform the
duties of the employee's regular job, a report must be filed between
6. 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.
7. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 137.3, 4, 6, 8, 17 (1971).
8. Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.6 (Supp. 1972).
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the 15th and 25th of each month. Further reports are to be made
when it is determined that a permanent disability has or will result
from the injury. The failure to file any of the prescribed reports with
the Industrial Commission is now a misdemeanor, punishable by a
fine of up to $200.
The Illinois general practitioner would be well-advised to familiarize himself with these requirements so that he may counsel his
business clients, who fall under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, of their new obligations under this law. In the
past a lawyer might meet his legal responsibilities by determining
whether or not his client's business falls within the coverage of the
Act, and if not, advise the client that he could elect to come under
the Act voluntarily. These obligations of accident recordation and
reporting fall squarely on the employer and that fact should certainly
be brought to his attention.
The Illinois employee who is rendered incapable of work as a result of a compensable injury or illness is entitled to benefits under
one of two distinct classifications. The specific loss or loss of use of
two major members suffered in one accident qualifies the employee
as being permanently, totally and completely disabled and, therefore, entitled to weekly benefits equal to the existing death benefit
and thereafter fifteen percent of the death benefit annually, regardless of whether or not the employee returns to any type of employment. This is generally called a "specific" permanent total disability
pursuant to Section 8(e)18. 9 The employee who suffered a "nonspecific" permanent total disability, that is an injury or illness not
involving loss or loss of use of two specific members which renders
the employee incapable of work pursuant to Section 8(f), 1° is
awarded the same weekly benefit as the specific permanent total disability equaling the death benefit and thereafter twelve percent of
that benefit annually for life, but subject to change if the employee
should return to work.
It has been generally felt that if an employee suffered an injury
limited to one specific major member, compensation would be limited to scheduled benefits for that member, notwithstanding the fact
that the employee may not have returned to work. The rationale for
9.
10.

Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.8(e) 18 (Supp. 1972).
II1. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.8(f) (Supp. 1972).
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this position was based on the language included in Section 8(e) of
the Act which allowed the employee compensation for temporary
total incapacity for work:
[The employee] . . . [sihall receive in addition thereto such compensation for a further period subject to limitations as to amounts provided in this Section for the specific loss therein mentioned, but shall not receive any compensation under any other
provisions of this Act. Unless otherwise specified, the following listed amounts shall
apply to either the loss of or the permanent and complete loss of use of the member
specified, such compensation for the length of time as follows. .. 1

In considering this language in Springfield Park District v. Industrial Commission,1 the court ruled that it did not limit the Industrial Commission to an award for the loss of use of an arm where
the employee was otherwise wholly and permanently incapable of
work, even though the injury was confined to the arm. The employee, by virtue of his age and prior work experience which was
limited to the use of both hands and arms, his complaint of constant
pain, a right arm which in spite of three operations was not restored
to use, and who was described by the treating physician as suffering
from post-traumatic neuritis and neuralgia (frozen elbow), and was
unable to pursue any of his previous occupations, was permanently
and totally disabled under Section 8(f).
The employer argued that the language of Section 8(e) cited
above, should limit recovery to the loss of use of the arm. The
court pointed out that "other expressions in this Act reinforce the
view that Section 8(e) was not intended to be the sole source of
compensation" as in this case.' 3 Section 8(e)18, after describing
the specific permanent total disability case, states that "these specific
cases of total permanent disability do not exclude other cases." Section 8(c) which provides compensation for disfigurement and Section 8(d) providing compensation for permanent partial incapacity
contain language specifically prohibiting compensation under other
sections where compensation is payable under Section 8(e). Section 8(f), which provides compensation for complete disability, contains no similar limiting language as do Sections 8(c) and 8(d).
Therefore, the court concluded:
11.

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.8(e) (Supp. 1972).

12. Springfield Park Dist. v. Industrial Comm., 49 Ill. 2d, 273 N.E.2d 376
(1971).
13. Id. at 71, 273 N.E.2d at 378.
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. . . that had the legislature intended that Section 8(e) schedule benefits were to be
exclusive for the loss of a single member, it (the legislature) would have inserted the
limiting language in Section 8(f). We consider that the expression "but shall not receive any compensation under any other provisions of this Act" does not confine a
claimant, who has suffered the loss of a single member, to recovery under Section 8
(e). An injury to one of the specified members not resulting in complete disability
in fact is compensable only under Section 8(e). But where that injury causes a permanent and total disability, compensation is available to the employee under Section
14
8(f) of the Act.

In an earlier decision the court clarified yet another limitation included in Section 8. Paragraph (h) limits, except in cases of complete disability, compensation payments to a period of no more than
8 years or 416 weeks. Although specific losses are generally described in terms of percentage of disability, the Act provides for specific weekly amounts for each of the scheduled members. One
hundred percent loss of use of a leg is more correctly described as
200 weeks of compensation for the complete loss of use of a leg.
It was argued, therefore, by the employee in American Bakeries v.
Industrial Commission'" that an award under Section 8(e) for specific losses and temporary total incapacity totaling 487- 2/3 weeks
of compensation was violative of the limitations contained in Section

8(h).
The court pointed out that prior to a 1931 amendment Section
8(e) allowed for compensation subject to the limitations as to time
and amount fixed by paragraphs 8(b) and 8(h). In 1931 the
amendments to Section 8(e) deleted the reference to limitation of
time. Since Section 8(d), which provides for partial incapacity,
refers to the time and amount limitations of Sections 8(b) and 8(h)
but such time limitation was deleted from Section 8(e), the legislative intent not to limit the weeks of compensation payable under
Section 8(e) to 416 weeks was clear. Equally clear was that the
Industrial Commission's award totaling more than 416 weeks for
specific losses under Section 8(e) was proper.
Finally, in considering limitations on Section 8 benefits, the court
has considered an award for disfigurement and for a specific loss of
use of each arm in Corn Products Company v. Industrial Commission. 6 The employee had cut his forehead and fell to the floor
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 71-72, 273 N.E.2d at 379.
50 Ill. 2d 146, 277 N.E.2d 864 (1971).
51 Ill. 2d 338, 282 N.E.2d 445 (1972).
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striking his neck. As a result, according to a medical report, he had
a permanent scar and a cervical spine injury causing an aggravation
of pain in his shoulder and arms that further resulted in a permanent partial loss of use of both arms. There was no photograph contained in the record so the court could not determine whether the
scar was inconspicuous or a disfigurement "which impairs or injures
the beauty, symmetry or appearance . . .; that which renders unsightly, mis-shapen or imperfect, or deforms in some manner" as
defined in Superior Mining Company v. Industrial Commission. 7
Under these circumstances the commission's award for disfigurement was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.' 8
Further, the court held that disfigurement to the face and disability to the arms could be awarded even when resulting from the same
accident since the injuries were to different members of the body and
such award was not prohibited by the language of Section 8 (c).
No compensation is payable under this paragraph where compensation is payable under paragraphs (d), (e) or (f) of this Section.
When the disfigurement is to the portions of the body designated in this paragraph, as
a result of any accident, for which accident compensation is not payable under paragraphs (d), (e) or (f) of this Section, compensation for such disfigurement may be
9
had under this paragraph.'

Here, in a single accident the employee suffered a disfigurement to
the face and disability of two arms and the award was proper under
the two different paragraphs of Section 8.
Whether the claimant is an employee or an independent contractor
is a "threshold inquiry" to be made in any claims arising under the
Act. In Bauer v. Industrial Commission,2 ° the claimant answered
an advertisement for part-time delivery men and signed a "Delivery
Contract" which provided that he, as an independent contractor, was
to receive fifty cents for each delivery. He was to insure his own
automobile for business usage and hold the company harmless in
any claims arising out of his delivery agreement. By specific terms
of the contract he was to be deemed an independent contractor and
be free from control or direction over the performance of the delivery
17. 309 Ill. 339, 141 N.E. 165 (1923).
18. Corn Products Co. v. Industrial Comm., 51 111. 2d 338, 342, 282 N.E.2d 445,
448 (1972).
19. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.8(e) (1971).
20. 51 111. 2d 169, 282 N.E.2d 448 (1972).
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service. The claimant was assigned delivery orders according to a
number given to him when he reported to work. There was no
penalty if he did not report for assignments and no income tax, unemployment compensation or social security tax was withheld from
his wages. He could choose his own delivery routes and had the discretion to refuse to deliver any orders. At the end of the evening he
would give the money he collected for the deliveries to the cashier,
less his share.
The court held that the claimant was not an employee, reversing
the Industrial Commission's award for injuries sustained when the
claimant's car was struck by another automobile while he was returning from a delivery.
Citing several of its previous decisions, the court stated the guidelines to be used in determining the employee-employer relationship:
the method of payment, the right to discharge, the skill required to
do the work, the furnishing of tools, material and equipment, along
with the single most important factor of the right to control the manner in which the work was done. The employee is subject to the
control and supervision of the employer at all times, while the independent contractor "represents the will of the owner only as to the
result and not as to the means by which it was accomplished."'" By
applying these tests the court found that factually there was no control over the claimant; and further, by contract, there was no right
to exclusive control.
Respondents required only that their products be delivered as rapidly as possible and
the drivers were free to choose any route they desired in order to fulfill this requirement . . . each driver was paid according to the number of deliveries he made.
Claimant had to supply his own car with equipment to keep the food warm as well as
pay his own expenses which included automobile insurance with extended coverage
22
for business usage.

Although a dissenting judge commented that the contractual language declaring the claimant an independent contractor, upon which
the majority based their opinion, was "a sham and subterfuge designed to achieve the exact result here obtained, '2 3 it seems quite
clear that the court also relied on the other incidents of the relationship to teach its decision.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 172, 282 N.E.2d at 450.
Id. at 172, 282 N.E.2d at 451.
Id. at 173, 282 N.E.2d at 451 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
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Constitutional attacks on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are rare since the law has been in effect in Illinois
over 60 years. Nevertheless, the court is called upon periodically
to consider such questions.
The court had previously upheld the constitutionality of Section
7(a) and (b) of the Act as it differentiated between a widow and
widower with respect to death benefits for the surviving spouse.2"
Section 7(a) provides death benefits to widows for their husband's
compensable death without regard to the degree of dependency,
while Section 7(b) allows recovery of such benefits by a surviving
husband only if he was totally dependent upon the earnings of the
employee-wife.
The constitutionality of these sections has again been considered
by the court in the case of Holiday Inns of America v. Industrial
Commission.2 5 An employee was fatally shot during a robbery at
the employer's motel; and the Industrial Commission awarded a statutory burial allowance, but denied further benefits because the husband failed to prove that he was totally dependent upon his wife's
earnings. The Circuit Court of Logan County, on certiorari, agreed
that the husband was not totally dependent, but held the classification of "husband" in Section 7(b) unconstitutional and ordered the
Industrial Commission to enter an award as if he were a widow.
The award was entered, confirmed and appealed to the supreme
court by the employer.
The claimant-husband argued that if no compensation was payable under Sections 7(a) or 7(b), then under Sections 7(c) and 7(d)
surviving parents or children, who were partically dependent, and
grandparents, grandchildren or collateral heirs, who were dependent
upon the employee's earnings to the extent of fifty percent or more,
can recover; and this arbitrarily and unreasonably required a husband to show total dependency while allowing others not as closely
related to the deceased to recover on a showing of partial dependency and renders the section unconstitutional.
In upholding the constitutionality of the section and remanding
for judgment in accordance with the original Industrial Commis24.

Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 I11. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969).

25.

48 Ill. 2d 528, 271 N.E.2d 884 (1971).
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sion decision, the court indicated that although they did not know
the reasons why the legislature allowed recovery under Sections 7(c)
and (d) on a showing of partial disability in light of the comprehensive social character and purpose of the Act. Further, the court
stated that "'there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others not included'."2 6 The
failure of the Act to allow recovery for husbands on a showing of
less than total dependency did not render the legislative schedule undesign the
constitutional, since the legislature was not required 2 to
7
Act in order to provide for any or all eligible conditions.
The compensability of injuries sustained by employees injured on
or around company parking lots has been the subject of several decisions in the past. Generally, if the parking lot is provided by the
employer and is customarily used by its employees, the employer
is considered responsible for the maintenance and control of the
parking lot, and injuries arising out of its use are compensable. 8
In Osborn v. Industrial Commission,2 9 the court considered the compensability of injuries sustained by an employee who had parked in
a company-owned parking lot, crossed the street to the factory,
worked her shift and was injured by an automobile driven by a coemployee as she re-crossed the public street on her way back to the
parking lot. The injuries were held not to arise out of and in the
course of employment. The employee was not acting for the benefit of or at the direction of the employer, and the street was not under the employer's control. This decision should be considered
along with Torbeck v. Industrial Commission,3 0 where it was held
that an employee injured by an automobile while crossing a public
street to pick up her lunch at a restaurant did sustain compensable
injuries. Here the employee was customarily told, after she began
her workday, what her hours would be for that day. They were irregular hours and depended on whether or not the employer would
be present in the store. When the employee reported for work on
the day of the accident she did not know if she would be required
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 553, 282 N.E.2d at 887.
Id.
DeHoyos v. Industrial Comm., 26 Il.2d 110, 185 N.E.2d 885 (1962).
50 Il. 2d 150, 277 N.E.2d 833 (1971).
2d 515, 276 N.E.2d 344 (1971).
49 Ill.
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to stay through her mealtime. She was told by the employer that
she was to work late and that she should go across the street to a
restaurant to pick up her meal and return to the store to eat. Her
presence in the street was held to be for the benefit and accommodation of the employer and occasioned by the demands of the employment. Both of the above cases sustained Industrial Commission
decisions based on uncontested factual situations.
Workmen's Compensation practitioners are apt to hear again and
again that the Civil Practice Act does not apply to Industrial Commission matters. That point has been ruled upon by the First District Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court in two different opinions. In Sears, Roebuck And Company v. Industrial Commission, 1 a writ of certiorari was quashed by the circuit court because it was not filed within twenty days of the receipt of an award
of the Industrial Commission as provided by Section 19 of the Act.
The appellate court indicated that if the writ had been seasonably
filed and the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, an
arguable question would accrue as to the applicability of Section 72
of the Civil Practice Act to any subsequent order, judgment, or decree from the circuit court since such a proceeding is a "statutory
proceeding" as defined by subsection (1) of Section 72. The appellant in the Sears case had filed a Section 72 petition, supported
by affidavit, explaining why the writ of certiorari was not filed within
the statutory period, in an attempt to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court. The holding infers that as to any proceedings in the circuit court relating to workmen's compensation matters, applicable
sections of the Civil Practice Act could apply.
In Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission,3 2 the Industrial Commission had refused to reinstate two cases which were dismissed for
want of prosecution by the arbitrator after the case had been set on
numerous occasions, the last of which was pursuant to a final notice
sent by the Industrial Commission and neither the employee nor his
counsel appeared. An unverified motion to reinstate was filed containing allegations as to why the matter should be reinstated. In
support of the writ of certiorari affidavits which set out facts relating
31.
32.

- Il1.App. -, 273 N.E.2d 725 (1971).
50 11. 2d 346, 278 N.E.2d 784 (1972).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII: 122

to the practice of the Industrial Commission in setting cases, were
filed with the circuit court. The employee argued that the unanswered allegations of the petitions to reinstate constituted admissions
of the allegations, and reinstatements should have been allowed
based on cases involving Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act. The
supreme court stated that the Civil Practice Act does not apply to
this type of proceeding and, furthermore, the burden of convincing
the Industrial Commission that its prayer for relief was justified was
on the petitioner. Granting or denying the petition to reinstate rests
in the sound discretion of the Industrial Commission. The court
felt that under the facts presented, the Industrial Commission did
not abuse its discretion in denying reinstatement.
With regard to the employee filing affidavits in support of the
writ of certiorari, the court held that the circuit court must decide
the case solely on the Industrial Commission record and has no authority to try the case de novo or to hear evidence. 33 In Brown v.
Industrial Commission,"4 a deposition that was not submitted to the
arbitrator or the commission was incorporated into the record and
submitted to the circuit court by stipulation. The court held that
deposition should not have been considered by the circuit court.
In any case, it seems established that the supreme court recognizes
the right of the Industrial Commission to dismiss cases for want of
prosecution as long as the dismissal is not arbitrary or an abuse of
discretion, even though such procedure is not set out in the statute.
Accordingly the practitioner would be well-advised to acquaint himself with the Industrial Commission rules,3" effective July 1, 1972,
relating to continuances, dismissals for want of prosecution and petitions to reinstate.
Finally, in Proctor Community Hospital v. Industrial Commission,6
the court considered the relationship between the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Illinois Interest Act. 7 Section 3 of the latter
33.
34.

Id. at 350, 278 N.E.2d at 786.
51 I1. 2d 291, 281 N.E.2d 673 (1972).

35. Rules Governing Practices Before The Industrial Commission Under The
Workmen's Compensation Act and Occupational Disease Act, adopted March 28,
1972, effective July 1, 1972.
36.
37.

50 I11. 2d 7, 276 N.E.2d 342 (1971).
I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 74, § 3 (1971).
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act allows five percent interest per annum from the date of judgment
which applies to Workmen's Compensation awards. The interest is
to be computed when judgments are entered on any awards running
from the time the award is made to the time of rendering judgment
on the award. 8 In this case, an award was entered by the Industrial Commission and set aside by the circuit court and later reinstated by the supreme court. The employer paid the award pursuant to the mandate, but refused to pay the interest. A judgment
for interest was entered pursuant to Section 19(g) of the Workmen's
Compensation Act which provides the procedure for reducing commission awards to judgments.
The employer argued that it was a non-debtor until the supreme
court reversed the circuit court; and, therefore, there was no judgment to which the statute could apply since the award was paid pursuant to the mandate. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, ruled
that the interest accrued from the date of the award, notwithstanding
that the award was subsequently reversed on appeal and on further
review reinstated.
The most cursory examination of these cases and the statutory
amendments reflects the everforward movement toward expanding
employer obligations and extending employee benefits. The trend
in both the legislative and judicial areas indicates a continuation of
this progressive policy well beyond the period of this survey. It is
difficult, at this time, to assess the legal validity and social acceptability of such a policy. However, it surely can be said that the Illinois courts and General Assembly have been quite diligent during
the past year in defining the rights and duties of employees and employers under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.

38.

Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 74, § 3 (1971).

